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Liability for Student Suicides and Other Violent Acts By Students Kurt J. Heinz
Shaping a Suicide Prevention Policy
In response to national publicity about student suicides, colleges and universities have developed policies to identify students at risk and programs aimed at reducing or preventing suicides. Although thus acting to reduce the risk, institutions also worry about lawsuits arising from suicide. This concern is not without justification. Several cases have raised the question as to what degree an institution of higher education has a duty to protect students from their own risky, violent, or negligent acts and those of their fellow students.
Most typically, however, appellate courts have held that a college or university has no legal duty to prevent a suicide of one of its students or to protect students from each other’s violent or negligent acts. They are not liable for injuries sustained by a student, whether self inflicted or caused by another student.
This principle is expressed in the only state supreme court decision on the subject of student suicide. In Jain v. State of Iowa, (Iowa 2000), the estate of a deceased student argued that a special relationship arose between a university and its student after the school obtained knowledge of the student’s recent suicidal thoughts and at least one suicide attempt. The plaintiff in Jain argued that the duty arose after a resident assistant prevented the student’s initial suicide attempt and advised the student to seek counseling. The Iowa Supreme Court nonetheless held that no special relationship arose and that the school did not have a duty to prevent the suicide.
This thinking is in line with the general common law principle that a party owes no duty to prevent an individual from harming himself or herself or to prevent harm caused by a third party. A very limited exception to this rule exists in the doctor or psychotherapist-patient context, particularly a duty to warn. However, courts have repeatedly held that defendants who are not health care professionals cannot be expected to foresee the risk of suicide. Since suicide is not foreseeable, there is no duty to prevent it.
The question of foresee ability raises unique issues in the context of university student suicides. While suicide among young adults has reached epidemic levels, it is not at all clear that the stress of college life puts students at any greater risk for suicide. The suicide rate is actually higher among individuals in the relevant age group who do not attend college. With that in mind, suicide risk is theoretically particularly unforeseeable in the higher education context. The move away from in loco parentis in the 1960’s has only reinforced the legal principle that schools are not liable for student suicides. The role of the institution from a legal perspective has been reduced to that of providing an education only, leaving it up to the students to manage their own lives.
But institutions, to their credit, do not limit themselves to serving only as purveyors of educational experiences. A host of well intended programs offering both means to identify and methods to treat potential suicide victims and aimed at enhancing campus life may act to mitigate the judicial hands-off approach.
The only reported decision imposing liability on a university for student suicide shows what can happen when an administrator aggressively intervenes. In Schieszler v. Ferrum College, a 2002 federal district court decision from Virginia, the court affirmed that, generally, there is no special relationship between a college and its students. However, the Court also ruled that, under the facts presented there, an exception was merited and denied a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s wrongful death complaint. In that case, the student had a long history of severe emotional problems, numerous vocal suicide threats, and a number of recent episodes of self-inflicted injuries, all of which were well known to the college. As a result of the student’s pattern of behavior, the college required him to sign a statement that he would not hurt himself, further illustrating, the court reasoned, that it was aware that the student might harm himself again. In effect, the Court read into these acts the assumption of a duty to protect this student from himself and changed an unforeseeable event into a predictable possibility. This “exception” or some variety of it could easily be asserted in most campus suicides, depending upon the institution’s acts in attempting to help the student.
An unpublished case is also illustrative. In 2005, in Shinn v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, a trial court in Massachusetts denied in part summary judgment in a student suicide case. There, the decedent had told teachers, resident assistants, counselors, doctors and administrators that she was suicidal several times during the time between her enrollment and her death a year and a half later. She had cut herself on more than one occasion. MIT referred her to counseling. Its administrators participated in meetings with doctors concerning her treatment and prognosis. She ultimately died after setting herself on fire in her dormitory room. MIT was sued under a breach of contract theory relying on the student handbook promise to provide reasonable medical services. The plaintiff alleged that MIT breached that promise. The Court granted summary judgment for MIT concluding that the promises were too vague to amount to a contractual duty. The Court also granted summary judgment on the allegation that MIT violated the Massachusetts Consumer Protection Act. Summary judgment was denied as to the medical personnel who were sued under medical malpractice theories. Most troubling, however, the claims against MIT administrators were allowed to stand. The Court relied on Schieszler to conclude a special relationship existed because of their knowledge of the decedent’s history and participation in meetings with the medical professionals. The decision granting summary judgment does not mention Jain v. Iowa.
MIT appealed this decision on behalf of its administrators and medical professionals and several colleges and universities filed amicus briefs. However, the case was settled before any appellate decision was issued and, pursuant to the settlement, the parties agreed that the death was not due to suicide. The best that can be said about this case is that it was simply a trial court decision which did not even mention the appellate case contrary to its holding, and is of no precedential value.
In forming campus policy, these “exception” cases should be considered. Schieszler and Shinn suggest that ignoring the problem of potential suicide is more legally advantageous than acting to stem incidents. Of course, doing so is not compatible with institutional policies and missions. Nonetheless, there is risk to institutions taking a proactive approach to dealing with the problem.
Erosion of the Court’s traditional hands-off policy toward institutions is evidenced by a recent Texas Court of Appeals opinion, Baven, et al. v. Comstock. The Baven case is one of several arising out of a 1999 bonfire at Texas A&M in which three students were killed and two injured when the bonfire collapsed. The Court held that, although Texas A&M was protected from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, its administrators could be sued in their individual capacities for negligent supervision of construction of the bonfire. Though the case decision is limited to sovereign immunity issues, it represents another example of a college being sued under a theory that it had a duty to protect its students from each other and it shows that, under the right circumstances, liability is possible.
Concerns raised by this suicide policy tightrope do not end with questions about assumed duty and foresee ability. While the subject is outside the scope of this note, policies which discourage or prohibit admission of students at perceived risk, as well as policies leading to sanction or termination based upon such perception, pose real legal questions, including under the American With Disabilities Act and state analogues. There are many more legal questions to consider in formulating a campus policy besides the risk of liability litigation.
Related Decisions: Other Violent or Risky Behavior
When it comes to other risky, violent, or negligent conduct by or between students, courts have also reasonably consistently declined to impose liability. As noted by the federal Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Bradshaw v. Rawlings, “adult students now demand and receive expanded rights of privacy in their college life . . . college administrators no longer control the broad arena of general morals.” . With this in mind, Bradshaw held that the college did not have a duty to prevent student drinking despite promulgating disciplinary regulations prohibiting the possession or consumption of alcohol by all students on college property or at college sponsored off-campus events, and was not liable for injuries to one of its students caused by another intoxicated student. In Bradshaw, the Court held that the disciplinary regulation did not place the college in a custodial relationship with its students and did not establish a voluntary assumption of a custodial relationship imposing a duty of protection.
This is consistent with other decisions such as the California decision of Baldwin v. Zoradi (college regulations mirroring state alcohol laws did not establish that the college voluntarily assumed a custodial relationship with its students for the purpose of imposing a duty of protection); the Utah decision of Beach v. University of Utah (holding it is unrealistic to charge a university with the additional duty of preventing students from illegally consuming alcohol, because fulfilling this charge would require the school to “babysit” each student and would be inconsistent with the nature of the relationship); and the Idaho decision of Coughlan v. Beta Pheta Pi Fraternity (Colleges are not insurers of the safety of their students).
Finally, in Freeman v. Busch, the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed a claim by a third-party invitee who was sexually assaulted at a campus party. The invitee brought a negligence action against the college urging the court to rely on Schieszler and to recognize a new special relationship between the college and the guest of a student. The court declined, specifically holding again that there is no special relationship between a college and its students, or the students’ guests and that it was unwilling to create such a duty. Yet, concerns remain that the barriers imposed by rules relating to foreseeability and duty may be breached after the style of the Texas A&M case.
The Illinois Experience
While no
The facts in Chalhoub are illustrative. There, the Court held that a lay defendant had no duty to secure a hand gun in his home which was later used in decedent’s suicide, even though the defendant actually knew the decedent had threatened to commit suicide. The Court noted that a defendant cannot be reasonably expected to secure his home to prevent a suicide, commenting “imposing such a burden would create an unreasonable risk for liability as the scope of such a burden would be ever expanding.” Analogizing this thinking, universities and other higher education institutions need not affirmatively act to create an environment which will minimize the risk of student suicides.
Arnstein & Lehr LLP represented a higher education institution in a case arising out of a student suicide. The decedent committed suicide in his dormitory after drinking alcohol in his dorm room. After he was discovered, he had nitrate oxide in his blood and a blood alcohol content of .254. Plaintiff argued that the institution had his medical records which noted a previous suicide attempt while in high school. It was contended that this created a duty to make an immediate appointment when plaintiff sought counseling. Plaintiff also argued the college was liable for failure to enforce its alcohol regulations. The trial court granted the college’s motion to dismiss, agreeing that it owed no duty to prevent student suicides. The dismissal was affirmed on appeal in an unreported decision.
Conclusion
While the law favors non-liability for student suicides and other violent student-on-student behavior, the cases teach that this posture is not inviolate. Either in individual cases or through a policy of general applicability, schools can assume duties and responsibilities not imposed at common law. And, if an institution ignores an obvious risk and has the means to intervene, liability could be imposed. Higher education institutions should consider these possibilities as they ponder whether and to what extent they should respond to the risk of student suicides and other violent behavior.
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